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A Comparative Analysis of Title VIII and
Section 1982
T. A. Smedley*
Future chroniclers of the struggle for racial justice in the United
States may note with some perplexity that the federal government,
after a century of cautiously eschewing the power to combat racially
discriminatory practices in housing, suddenly in 1968 entered the
battle on two fronts. On April 11, The Civil Rights Act of 1968, with
its Fair Housing Title,1 became the law of the land. Just over two
months later the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
ruled, on the basis of earlier legislation, that refusal to sell housing
because of the race of the prospective purchaser is unlawful.2
Prior to the launching of these two major salvos by the legislative
and judicial branches, the executive department had fired a few
probing rounds against the bastions of housing discrimination; but
because they were relatively limited in range and ineffectual in result,
those preliminary efforts created little commotion. The biggest gun
employed in this tentative assault by the executive was the Presidential
Executive Order No. 11063,3 issued on November 20, 1962. This
became the heralded "single stroke of the pen" remedy, which John
F. Kennedy had made a campaign issue back in 1960 but had not
found the strength to execute until he had been in office for nearly
two years. The Order cited the unfairness, injustice, and inconsistency
inherent in the granting of federal funds to construct and maintain
housing from which American citizens are excluded because of their
race, creed, color or national origin. It invoked the power, and duty,
of the executive department to assure that federal laws are fairly
administered and benefits thereunder are made available on a
nondiscriminatory basis. The President directed all executive agencies
"to take all action necessary and appropriate to prevent
discrimination," on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin,
in regard to the "sale, leasing, rental or other disposition of
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Director, Race Relations Law Survey.
I. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73. Titles Vill and IX contain the fair housing
provisions.
2. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
3. 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962), 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1019 (1962).
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residential property and related facilities (including land to be
developed for residential use), or in the use or occupancy thereof," if
such property and facilities were: (a) owned or operated by the federal
government, or (b) provided with loans, grants or contributions made
by the federal government, or (c) provided with loans insured or
guaranteed by the federal government, or (d) provided by the
development of land obtained through urban renewal programs
carried out by state or local government agencies with the assistance
of federal funds.4 The Order also applied to institutions making
housing loans insured or guaranteed by the federal government.
The President directed the federal agencies involved to attempt to
secure compliance with the Order and its implementing regulations by
first employing conciliation and persuasion, but thereafter by
resorting to such enforcement weapons as cancellation of agreements
to provide federal financial assistance, refusal to extend federal aid to
any other program proposed by the offending persons, or withholding
approval of a lending institution as a beneficiary under any federal
assistance program. The agencies were also authorized to refer
instances of non-compliance to the U. S. Attorney General, "for such
civil or criminal action as he may deem appropriate." ' Further, a
President's Committee for Equal Opportunity in Housing was
established with the responsibility of coordinating the activities of the
various agencies under the Order and of encouraging the elimination
of discrimination in housing built with federal assistance. However,
the Committee had no affirmative enforcement powers. The Federal
Housing Authority,' the Veterans Administration,7 and some other
executive department agencies8 drew up regulations and directives
designed to implement the Order.
While this action demonstrated a commendable concern in the
executive department regarding the problems of racial discrimination
4. Exec. Order No. 11063, § 101 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
5. Id. § 303.
6. FHA Housing and Home Finance Agency Regulations ch. Ii, Nov. 27 & 29, 1962
amendments, reprinted in 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1283 (1962), and Aug. 12, 1963 amendment,
reprinted in 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1275 (1963); 24 C.F.R. § 200.320 (Supp. 1964)
(nondiscrimination pledge); 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.300, 200.330 (Supp. 1964) (sale of FHA-acquired
housing).
7. VA Regulations ch. 1, Nov. 20, 1962 amendment, reprinted in 7 RACE REL. L. REP.
1281 (1962), and Interim Issue 11 26-63-3, March 8, 1963, reprinted ii 8 RACE REL. L. REP.
748 (1963); 38 C.F.R. § 36A363 (1968) (nondiscrimination pledge).
8. E.g., Farmers Home Administration, Dep't of Agriculture, Administration Letter 777
(444), reprinted in 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1280 (1962); Secretary of Defense Directive on
Nondiscrimination in Family Housing, reprinted in 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 325 (1963).
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in housing, its practical effect as a remedy against such discrimination
was limited by several considerations. By its own terms, the Executive
Order is applicable only to housing built with federal assistance
pursuant to agreements entered after November 20, 1962. Further, it
is not broad enough to effect the practices of mortgage lending
institutions not related to FHA mortgage insurance or VA mortgage
guaranties. Thus, it left untouched most of the transactions of the
innumerable banking and lending institutions which are in fact under
some supervision and regulation by federal agencies In addition, the
regulations adopted to implement the Order expressly exempt
individual homeowners with FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed loans
from the prohibition against racial discrimination in sales of their
homes. 0 Also, the person against whom the discrimination is directed
has no remedy, either in the form of damages or an injunctive order
requiring a sale to him. Rather, effectuation of the protection intended
is dependent on the action of federal administrative officials, who are
vested with narrowly restricted powers.
In the face of the inadequacy of the efforts of the executive
department, Congress refused to enact a proposed limited fair housing
law in 1966,11 but finally responded with such legislation in April,
1968. By an unlikely coincidence, at the precise time the final debates
on this statute were being conducted in Congress, the Supreme Court
was hearing arguments in the Jones case on the question of whether
another federal statute, section 1982,12 enacted 102 years earlier,
prohibits discrimination against Negroes in the sale of housing. In the
course of the 1968 congressional debates, it was suggested that if the
Court answered the question in the affirmative, the pending legislation
would not be needed because the 1866 statute would provide adequate
protection against such discrimination. 3 Since the Court's decision in
June that the earlier statute "bars all discrimination, private as well
9. See generally Note, Nondiscrimination Implications of Federal Involvement in
Housing, 19 VAND. L. REv. 865, 880-85 (1966).
10. 24 C.F.R. § 200.315o(b) (Supp. 1964). See generally Note, supra note 9 at 865, 888-93.
II. H.R. Doc. No. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1966), introduced by Congressman
Celler of New York, May 2, 1966.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964), originally enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as part
of ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, and re-enacted in the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16
Stat. 140, 144. The present text of § 1982 is as follows: "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
13. Hearings on H.R. 2516 Before the Subcommn. on Housing and Urban AJairs of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 229 (1968).
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as public, in the sale or rental of property," many people now assume
that the two statutes cover the same ground.
While there is, to be sure, considerable duplication of coverage,
the two statutes differ substantially in scope of application and
methods of enforcement.
Initially, it should be observed that the 1968 Act was not
intended to supersede the post-Civil War era statute. The content of
the 1968 congressional debates points to the knowledge of the
members of Congress that the 1866 statute was still in effect and that
it might soon be construed to apply to housing discrimination by
private individuals. Nevertheless, the 1968 Act contains no provisions
repealing or revising any terms of the earlier legislation, though the
Act could easily have been so drawn had that result been intended.
Instead, section 815 expressly declares that: "Nothing in this title
[VIII] shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of . . . any
• . . jurisdiction in which this title shall be effective, that grants,
guarantees, or protects the same rights as are granted by this
title. . . ." Under such circumstances, one must assume that
Congress did not intend the 1968 statute to affect the validity or
application of its century-old predecessor. 4 Following the Jones
decision, accusations were carried in the public press to the effect that
the Supreme Court, in construing the 1866 Act to prohibit
discriminatory acts by individual home owners selling their own
property, had informed Congress that the legislators did not mean
what they said in the 1968 Act. Such statements apparently must be
credited to mis-information or irresponsibility.
Neither statute can be accurately categorized as the broader or
narrower in scope, or necessarily the stronger or weaker in effective
application. In seeking to implement the common purpose of
eliminating discriminatory practices in the housing field, each act
reaches areas not affected by the other. First, while section 1982
protects against discrimination because of race and color, Title VIII
goes further, prohibiting the designated types of discriminatory
conduct based on "race, color, religion or national origin."' 5 Thus,
protection against discrimination extends not only to Negroes but also
to other people who have on occasion been denied the right to purchase or
lease residential facilities because they are, for example, Mexican-
14. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 n.20 (1968).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1968 §§ 804, 805, 806, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
1968 Civil Rights Act].
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Americans, or adherents of the Jewish faith, or persons of Italian or
Polish ancestry.
Second, in regard to the types of discriminatory conduct
proscribed, the 1968 Act appears to be somewhat more far-reaching.
The older legislation attempts to insure that all citizens of the nation
shall have the same rights to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real . . . property" without racial discrimination. Though the
language is broad, the protection appears to center on the specific
transactions by which persons obtain and maintain ownership,
possession, and use of property; and the housing discrimination
intended to be eliminated would generally be of the kinds engaged in
by owners of property trying to avoid selling or leasing to Negroes. In
section 804, the 1968 statute explicitly makes it unlawful "to refuse to
sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person" because of race, religion or natural
origin. It also forbids: (1) discrimination in "the terms, conditions
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith;" (2) the making, printing
or publishing of any notice, statement or advertisement, regarding the
sale or rental of a dwelling, which indicates ,any preference, limitation
or discrimination based on race, etc.; (3) false representations, made
on racial, etc., considerations, that any dwelling is not available for
inspection, sale or rental; and (4) blockbusting-inducing, with profit
motivation, any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations
that persons of a particular race, etc., are about to move into the
neighborhood.
Further, the effect of Title VIII of the 1968 Act reaches beyond
the owner, seller or lessor. Section 805 expressly makes it unlawful for
any bank or other business engaged in making real estate loans to
deny financial assistance on the basis of race, etc., when the assistance
is sought for the purpose of purchasing, constructing, improving,
repairing or maintaining a dwelling. Also, it is unlawful to
discriminate in regard to terms or conditions of the financial
assistance because of the race, etc., of the person applying or of any
person associated with him in connection with the transaction.,, It is
quite possible that the general language of the 1866 Act could be
16. However, § 805 expressly states that the restrictions contained therein are not to
"impair the scope of effectiveness" of the § 803(b) exception, which exempts sales or rentals of
single-family houses by their owners from the application of the Act in designated situations.
19691
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interpreted to prohibit racially discriminatory practices by lending
institutions in the financing of purchases or rental of housing, since
such practices could readily be considered to be an infringement of the
equal rights of citizens to purchase, lease, and sell real property.'
However, the 1968 statute not only removes all doubt as to
prohibition of discriminatory financing, but it also covers transactions
in which no sale or leasing is involved, by forbidding discrimination in
the financing of construction, improvement, repair, and maintanance
of housing.
Section 806 places restrictions also on those who provide
brokerage services, by broadly prohibiting them from denying any
person, because of race, etc., access to or membership or participation
in any multiple-listing services, real estate brokers organizations, or
other facilities relating to the business of selling and renting housing.
Finally, Congress included two significant provisions against
intirmidation of or interference with persons who have attempted to
take advantage of the benefits of the statute or who have acted to
comply with the statute by respecting the rights which it grants to
others. Section 817 makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten
or interfere with any person exercising his statutory rights or any
person aiding other persons to exercise their rights. It provides for
civil remedies for such unlawful conduct-presumably including both
damages and injunctive relief. Section 901 provides criminal sanctions
against anyone who, because of race, etc., "by force or threat of
force, wilfully injures, intimidates or interferes with" any person (or
attempts to do so) because he is exercising rights under the Act or
complying with the terms of the Act, or is aiding or encouraging
others to obtain the benefits or to comply with obligations of the Act,
or is lawfully participating in speech or assembly to oppose denials of
rights granted by the Act. The penalties prescribed are: fines up to
1000 dollars and imprisonment up to one year, or both, if no bodily
injury results from the wrongdoing; 10,000 dollar fines and ten years
imprisonment, if bodily injury does result; and imprisonment for any
term of years or for life, if death results from the violation.
On the other hand, a comparison of the two statutes discloses
that the earlier Act is much broader in at least one respect: it grants
17. In the Jones case, the Supreme Court noted that the 1866 Act "does not refer
explicitly to discrimination in financing arrangements or in the provision of brokerage services."
However, it then promptly disclaimed any intention to express a view as to whether such services
or facilities might under some circumstances be deemed to constitute "property" within the
meaning of § 1982. 392 U.S. at 413 & n.10.
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rights to all citizens, and it makes no exceptions as to the persons who
are under the duty to recognize and respect the rights granted by the
Act when they are engaged in the named types of transactions.18 By
contrast, the 1968 Act contains some temporary exemptions of
persons and transactions through delays in the time at which it
becomes effective, and also provides for significant permanent
exemptions of certain persons and transactions from the application
of statute.
Title VIII was designed to take effect in three stages, depending
upon the kinds of housing covered and the types of transactions
involved." From the date of enactment to the end of 1968, the
prohibitions against discrimination designated in section 804 applied
only to transactions involving dwellings already subject to the effect of
the 1962 Executive Order (housing owned or operated by the federal
government and housing constructed with federal financial assistance
or with federally insured loans under agreements made subsequent to
November 20, 1962) and on which any required repayment of the
grants or loans had not yet been completed at the date of the passage
of the Act. Even as to dwellings within this classification, the Act did
not apply during 1968 to the sale or rental of: (1) a multiple-family
dwelling containing living quarters (rooms, or apartments) for four or
18. The explicit determination of the Supreme Court in the Jones case that the 1866
statute prohibits discriminatory conduct by private individuals, as well as by governmental
action, is the factor in the decision which gives that statute the potential for being an effective
means of combatting racial discrimination in housing. This was the issue on which the two
dissenting members of the Court expressed their disagreement with the majority.
19. 1968 Civil Rights Act §§ 803(a) & (b).
Chart of Three Stage Coverage of Dwellings Under Section 804
April 11, 1968
Covered if Federally as-
sisted under agreements
made after Nov. 20, 1962




whether or not Federally
assisted.
1. Multi-family dwellings of five or more units;
2. Multi-family dwellings of four or fewer units if the
owner does not reside in one of the units.
3. Single family houses not owned by private individuals;
4. Single family houses owned by a private individual
who owns more than three such houses or who, in
any two-year period sells more than one such house
in which he was not the most recent resident.
January 1, 1970
All dwellings covered under
Stages 1 and 2 plus any:
1. Single family houses sold
or rented through a broker
or other person in the busi-
ness of selling or renting
dwellings.
2. Single family houses
offered for rent or sale
through a discriminatory
written notice or advertise-
ment.
[Taken from a pamphlet entitled "Fair Housing in Tennessee" published by the Tennes-
see Commission For Human Development (1968).]
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fewer families (or single individuals), when the owner of the dwelling
resided in one of such living quarters; and (2) a single-family house
owned by a private individual, unless (a) he owned more than three
such houses at any one time, or (b) he made, within a two-year
period, more than one sale of such housing of which he was not the
most recent resident (in which case the Act applied to all sales after
the first one).
During the second stage, the calendar year of 1969, the Act
became applicable to privately-financed housing, subject however to
the same exemptions as those applied to the federally-financed
housing during 1968. In addition, on January 1, 1969, the
prohibitions against discrimination by lending institutions, stated in
section 805, and by real estate brokerage organizations, stated in
section 806, became effective.
The third stage, scheduled to begin on January 1, 1970, extends
the coverage to the sale or leasing of single-family houses owned by
private individuals, if the transactions are carried on with the use of
services or facilities of real estate agents or other persons engaged in
the business of selling or renting dwellings, or if advertisements or
written notices indicating any preference, limitations or discrimination
based on race, etc., are used in attempting to make the sales or
leasings.
Thus, upon reaching its broadest coverage, the Act still will not
apply to: (1) the rental of a multiple-family dwelling with units for
four or fewer families (or single individuals) if the owner lives in one
of the units; or (2) the sale or rental of a dwelling by its private
owner, without the assistance of a real estate agent or the equivalent,
and without advertisement or written notice indicating discriminatory
preferences or limitations. However, this second exemption does not
apply to an owner of four or more dwellings, and beyond the first
sale, does not apply to an owner who, during a two-year period,
makes more than one sale of a dwelling in which he was not the most
recent resident. Further, there is a specific exemption declaring that
the Act does not prohibit a religious organization, or a nonprofit
organization operated or controlled by a religious organization, from
limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or
operates for non-commercial purposes to persons of the same religion,
unless membership in such religion is restricted on account of race,
color, or national origin20 In addition, a bona fide private club which
20. 1968 Civil Rights Act § 807.
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as an incident to its primary purposes, provides lodgings owned or
operated by it for a non-commercial purpose is not prohibited from
limiting the rental or occupancy of such lodgings to its own
members.
2'
Since the statute covers all multiple-family dwellings of over four
units, all multiple-family dwellings of two to four units when the
owner is not a resident of the dwelling, all single-family houses not
owned by private individuals, and all single-family houses sold through
real estate agencies, it has been estimated that the prohibitions against
discriminatory dealings will apply to between 75 and 85 per cent of
the total housing supply of the nation after January 1, 1970.22 The
Jones decision, however, appears to make the 1866 statute applicable
to 100 per cent of the total housing supply, without delay and without
exemptions favoring single-family house owners!'
Two additional points of contrast between the scope of the two
statutes should be noted. The 1866 Act provides for equal rights in
regard to "real and personal property," while the 1968 Act prohibits
discriminatory practices in transactions involving a "dwelling," which
is defined as "any building, structure, or portion thereof which is
occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by
one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or
for the construction or location thereon of any such building,
structure, or portion thereof. 214 While both cover realty, the recent
legislation seems to be concerned only with "housing" property, used
or to be used to provide residences. The earlier statute, however,
applies as well to purely commercial property and agricultural lands
not involving residential usage.
21. Id.
22. See Robison, American Jewish Cong. Comm'n on Law and Social Action Report,
March 25, 1968, at I ("estimated at 80 to 85 per cent of the total housing market"); National
Comm'n Against Discrim. in Housing, Trends in Housing, vol. 12, no. 5, May-July, 1968, at I
("about 77 per cent of the Nation's total housing supply").
23. The fact that the 1866 Act has been held to apply to individual owners selling their
single family dwellings, while the 1968 Act does not so apply, seems to have produced a sudden
change of sentiment among some real estate agents. Though generally opposed in the past to
restrictions on owners' power to sell housing according to racial preference, these agents have
recently been heard to complain that HUD officials are at fault in concerning themselves with
the enforcement of the 1968 Act, with its more limited coverage, instead of stressing the more
absolute prohibitions of the 1866 Act as construed in the Jones case. One might assume that
such complaints are not based entirely on a new-found enthusiasm for fair housing laws, but
rather on the fear that individual house-owners, thinking only of the 1968 Act, will try to sell
their houses without calling for the services of the real estate agents.
24. 1968 Civil Rights Act § 802(b).
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Moreover, the inclusion of personal property within the coverage
of the 1866 Act makes it applicable to the aspects of housing
transactions which relate to furniture and other non-realty features of
"dwellings." Thus, it apparently provides protection against certain
discriminatory devices which might be resorted to in renting or selling
furnished apartments or houses-such as offering a Negro bidder the
same terms as white bidders in regard to the house and lot, but
imposing harsher terms in regard to the furnishings. It is not clear
that the 1968 Act includes such protection, though the prohibition in
section 804(b) against discrimination "in the provision of services or
Jacilities" in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling might be
construed to apply to discriminatory manipulations regarding
personalty located in dwellings. Also reaching beyond the field of
housing, the 1866 Act surely makes it unlawful for operators of retail
stores to refuse to sell to Negroes because of race. Therefore, the
earlier legislation definitely carries broader significance in the
commercial world than does the recent statute.2
Finally, some substantial distinctions between the two statutes are
to be found in the means by which their respective provisions may be
enforced. Section 1982 of the 1866 Act merely declares the right and
does not specify any remedies for violations. The plaintiffs in the
Jones case brought suit under 28 U.S.C. section 1343(4), which
confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts in civil actions "to
recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the
right to vote." The complaint asked for injunctive relief and a small
award of compensatory damages. The Supreme Court, in reversing
the district court's dismissal of the complaint and the court of
appeals's affirmance of that action, stated that the plaintiffs would be
entitled to an injunction, and observed generally that: "[tihe fact that
42 U.S.C. [s]ection 1982 is couched in declaratory terms and provides
no explicit method of enforcement does not, of course, prevent a
federal court from fashioning an effective equitable remedy.''6
Such a remedy could, and often would, include: (1) a preliminary
25. "It is entirely possible that, in subsequent litigation, the phrase 'real and personal
property,' will be given constantly wider interpretation so that it will cover services in connection
with property and, ultimately, services generally. By such a process, Section 1982 could become
what Senator Trumbull said it was, a law to 'break down all discrimination between black men
and white men.' " Robison, American Jewish Cong. Comm'n on Law and Social Action Report,
June 26, 1960, at 10.
26. 392 U.S. at 414 n.13.
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injunction restraining a defendant from selling or leasing the housing
in question to any person other than the plaintiff pending a
determination of the merits of the case (unless the sale or lease was
expressly made subject to the rights of the plaintiff as they might later
be determined); and (2) after a decision in favor of the plaintiff is
reached, a permanent injunction which (a) prohibits the defendant
from denying the plaintiff or any other persons the right to purchase
or lease the housing because of their race, and (b) orders the
defendant to sell or lease to the plaintiff the housing in question or
some other housing of comparable quality, location, and utility.2 This
kind of relief is commonly provided under state fair housing laws.
The Supreme Court did not determine the Jones's right to recover
damages, because it appeared that they had not in fact suffered any
actual loss for which the law allows compensatory damages; nor did
the Court pass upon the general issue of whether compensatory
damages may be awarded for violation of section 1982.8 However,
since monetary loss can obviously result directly from discriminatory
refusal to sell or rent housing 9 and since section 1343(4) expressly
confers jurisdiction on the federal courts in actions to recover
damages for violations of federally pr6tected civil rights, it would
seem to follow that compensatory damages for actual losses for which
damages can be awarded under the common law should be
recoverable 0 In instances in which the defendant's discriminatory
acts against the plaintiff were willfully and maliciously done, punitive
damages might also be awarded i
27. Plaintiffs in the Jones case sought an order requiring defendants: (I) to sell them a
named type of house on a specified lot or some other lot in the subdivision which would be
sufficient for the type of house selected; (2) not to sell the designated lot pending the litigation;
and (3) to refrain from future discrimination in the sale of homes in the subdivision. See cases
discussed in note 31 infra.
28. 392 U.S. at 414 n.14. Damages in the amount of $50 were sought in the Jones case;
but apparently no evidence of actual loss was offered, and the Supreme Court presumed that
with the aid of injunctive relief plaintiffs would be able to buy a house from defendants at the
prices being charged when plaintiffs had wrongfully been refused the opportunity to buy in 1965.
29. See. e.g., Barnes v. Sind, 223 F. Supp. 572 (D.C. Md., 1963), revd, 341 F.2d 676 (4th
Cir. 1965), 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 325 (1965); State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Zaccaro, 12
RACE REL. L. REP. 2283 (1968) (N.Y. State Comm'n for Human Rights, No. CH-14354-67,
1967).
30. However, it seems that these damages would not include compensation for litigation
expenses incurred by plaintiffs in enforcing their rights. American common law has generally
refused to regard expenses of litigation as a recoverable item of damages for civil wrongs. C.
McCoRIICK, DAMAGES § 61 (1935). But see cases discussed in note 31 infra.
31. In two cases decided on the basis of the Jones case, the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of California found that the defendants had refused to rent housing to the
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Whatever may be the scope of the remedy for violation of rights
protected by section 1982, the enforcement of those rights is generally
restricted to a single method: the prosecution of a civil action by the
aggrieved party, normally in the federal courts. In the case of a
conspiracy among two or more persons to deprive another person of
his rights under section 1982 or to injure him because of his having
exercised such rights, 18 U.S.C. section 2412 may sustain a criminal
prosecution against the conspirators, with possible punishments of a
fine up to 5000 dollars, or imprisonment up to ten years, or both.
In contrast to the earlier statute, the 1968 Act specifies a variety
of methods by which enforcement of the provisions of the statute may
be secured. The administration of the Act is delegated to the
Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). He is expressly directed to cooperate with state and local
agencies in carrying out programs for eliminating discriminatory
housing practices, to carry on educational and conciliation activities
which will further the purposes of this statute, and to work out
programs to promote voluntary compliance with and to aid in
enforcement of the statute.
In cases of violations, five types of remedies are provided:
(1) Administrative proceeding before the HUD Secretary 3 Any
person claiming to be discriminated against in violation of the Act
plaintiffs because of race, and issued temporary injunctions prohibiting defendants from
showing, renting, or selling the properties in question to any persons other than the plaintiffs
and from refusing to show the properties to the plaintiffs at a reasonable time within 48 hours
of the service of the order. As a result, the accommodations were promptly rented to the
plaintiffs. Subsequently, the court entered judgments for sums of money which represented
'actual damages, punitive damages, [and] attorneys fees and costs." Vaughn v. Su, No. 49,643
(injunction issued on July 19, 1968; damages judgment for $435 entered on December 3, 1968)
(single-family dwelling); Turner v. Lazarus, No. 50,366 (injunction issued on November 22,
1968; damages judgment for $832.50 entered on December 3, 1968) (apartment in multiple-unit
building). See also Taylor v. Castagna, U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., No. 68 Civil 4991, Dec. 13, 1968,
in which the court, in a suit charging an apartment owner with racial discrimination in violation
of see. 1982, issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting defendant from renting the apart-
ment in question to anyone other than plaintiff pending the outcome of the suit.
32. "If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same, . . . they shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
33. 1968 Civil Rights Act § 810. Under § 810(c), wherever state or municipal fair
housing laws are in effect prohibiting discriminatory practices and providing remedies equivalent
to those of the federal Act, the Secretary must refer a complaint to the proper state or
municipal agency and must take no further action if that agency has begun proceedings on the
complaint within 30 days of the referral and carries them forward promptly.
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may file a written complaint with the Secretary within 180 clays after
the occurrence of the alleged -unlawful conduct. The Secretary must
then investigate the complaint and notify the complainant promptly
whether he intends to resolve it. If he accepts the case and finds that
discrimination has occurred, he must try to eliminate the unlawful
practices by persuasion and conciliation. If he is unable to obtain volun-
tary compliance by such means, he is not vested with any power to
enforce compliance. At that point the complainant may institute a
civil action in a federal district court to enforce his rights under the
Act. If the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has oc-
curred or is about to occur, it may enjoin the defendant from so
acting, "or order such affirmative action as may be appropriate. ' 34
(2) Civil action by the aggrieved party in federal or state court? 5
Without resorting to the administrative remedy, a person whose rights
under the Act have been violated may institute a civil action in a federal
district court or in a state or local court within 180 days after the
alleged discriminatory conduct. In such a case the court "may grant as
relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction,
temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award the plain-
tiff actual damages and not more than 1000 dollars punitive damages,
together with court costs and reasonable attorneys fees in the case of a
prevailing plaintiff." Attorneys fees are awarded only if the plaintiff is
deemed not to be financially able to bear such expenses. In some cir-
cumstances, a federal court may also appoint an attorney for the
plaintiff and authorize the suit to be brought without payment of fees,
costs, or security.
(3) Civil action by the United States Attorney General35 In sit-
uations in which the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
(a) that a person or group of persons is engaged in a "pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted
by [Title VIII]," or (b) that any group has been denied any rights
granted by this title, and "such denial raises an issue of general public
importance," he may institute a civil suit in a federal district court,
requesting such injunctive relief as may be needed "to insure the full
enjoyment of rights granted by this title." The extent to which this
authority will be exercised is within the discretion of the Attorney
34. Id. § 810(d). "However, this subsection requires the aggrieved party to resort first to
equivalent judicial remedies under state or municipal fair housing laws, if any such remedies
exist.
35. Id. § 812.
36. Id. § 813(a).
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General's office. While there is little basis for supposition as to whether
this potentially effective remedy will be extensively employed, in the
past few years good use has been made of similar authority, conferred
by almost identical language in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to combat
discriminatory practices in employment and in the operation of public
accommodations
7
(4) Civil action for interference with the exercise of rights 8
Intimidation of or interference with persons exercising their rights under
the Act or persons aiding others in exercising those rights is declared
unlawful by section 817. This provision specifies that it may be enforced
by "appropriate civil action." Surely such appropriate action would
include a suit for injunctive relief to prevent the continuation of the
wrongful conduct in the future. It should also include a suit to recover
damages for past conduct violating this section, if the complainant
can prove that he has sustained actual damages from the wrongdoing.
(5) Criminal prosecution for interference with the exercise of
rights 9 Forcible interference with persons complying with or exercising
rights under the Act, or encouraging others to do so, is made a
criminal offense by section 901. Enforcement of this sanction is in
the hands of the federal district attorneys, who, of course, will be
strongly influenced by the policies and attitudes of the U.S. Attorney
General's office. Vigorous early use of this remedy could be quite
effective in forestalling overt opposition to the enforcement of the Act
and in creating a favorable atmosphere for both the confident exercise
of rights created by the Act and the willing compliance with duties
imposed by the Act. However, the obvious difficulties of proving the
violations beyond a reasonable doubt and the probable disinclination
of many juries to support strict enforcement of the open housing
principle may reduce the effectiveness of the criminal remedy.
As this examination of the provisions of the 1866 and 1968
federal statutes indicates, the existence of two different pieces of
legislation dealing in substantially different terms with racially
discriminatory housing practices obviously does not represent an ideal
situation. Some confusion of rights, remedies and obligations and
some duplication of effort undoubtedly will occur. A single,
comprehensive statute, carefully drafted to eliminate overlaps, to fill
gaps, and to clarify ambiguities certainly would provide a better
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 2000a-5 & 20OOe-6 (1964).
38. 1968 Civil Rights Act § 817.
39. Id. § 901.
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instrument for combatting discrimination in housing. However, in the
nation's present political clifriate, it is unlikely that a new piece of
legislation incorporating the strong points of the two existing statutes
could be agreed upon by majorities in both branches of Congress.
Thus, for the indefinite future, fair housing law in the United States
apparently will continue to exist in the form of a patchwork structure
consisting of the reconstruction period Act of 1866, The Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1968, and a variety of state statutes and municipal
ordinances.

